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Introduction1 
On 1 July 2009, the Bainimarama regime announ-
ced a Roadmap for Democracy that promised a 
transition to parliamentary democratic rule by 
September 2014 (Ministry of National Planning 
2009). An important part of this Roadmap, accord-
ing to the same announcement, was the plan for a 
constitution-making process that would provide a 
‘solid foundation and framework for the rebuilding 
of our nation [that is] is critical for Fiji’. To ensure 
national ownership of the Constitution, the regime 
promised a participatory constitution-making pro-
cess that would involve political parties, the private 
sector, civil society, non-government organizations, 
and citizens of Fiji.
The aim of this paper is to critically examine 
the 2012 constitution-making process in Fiji focus-
ing on the principle of participation and how it 
was translated into practice. This was one of the 
central guiding principles of the Commission and, 
more importantly, this principle is now judged as a 
universal tenet of constitution-making. While liter-
ature clearly shows the possibilities of constitution-
making processes in transition from conflict and 
in post-conflict societies, experience of the 2012 
constitution-making process in Fiji will highlight 
the inherent difficulties in such processes in situa-
tions of tightly controlled military regimes. 
This paper is divided into four main parts. 
Firstly, the paper will lay out a brief theoretical 
framework for participation that would be used to 
analyse the findings. The second part presents a 
short overview of the history of constitution-mak-
ing in Fiji while the third part will provide a brief 
insight into the 2012 process and finally the paper 
will discuss the 2012 constitution-making process 
and present an analysis of how the principle of par-
ticipation was manifested.
Part I: Participation and Constitution-Making
There is an ever-growing literature on constitution-
making in transitional societies. Constitution-
making has over time shifted from elite-led 
closed-session events to ones with high levels of 
civic engagement (Moehler & Marchant). Whilst 
scholarly literature during the second wave of 
democratisation and constitution-making focused 
on the content and provisions of constitutions 
when judging democratic credentials, the later 
stages of the third wave of democratisation and 
constitution-making placed more emphasis on the 
process (Moehler & Marchant n.d., 1–2; Ginsburg 
2012, 4; Saunders 2014, 3). This shift has led 
scholars and policy makers to advocate greater 
public involvement and greater transparency as 
an international norm and as the best practice for 
constitution-making (Moehler & Marchant n.d., 3; 
Frank & Thiruvengadam 2010; Abdelgabar 2013; 
Ghai & Galli 2009; Banks 2008, 1046).   
In spite of the near-universal acknowledgment 
of these standards, the way in which participation 
is translated into practice varies greatly. Jon Elster 
identifies and distinguishes the type and intensity 
of participation and citizen engagement as either 
‘upstream’ or ‘downstream’ (Elster 1995). ‘Upstream’ 
engagement refers to engagement through the 
election of members to a Constituent Assembly and 
from direct engagement via consultation during 
drafting phases, to indirect forms of engagement 
through civic education programs, whereas 
‘downstream’ engagement refers to participation 
through a referendum on a final document (Elster 
1995). However, there is no agreement thus far 
amongst scholars and policy 
makers as to what level and system 
of participation and engagement 
produces the most desirable 
outcome. 
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International Standards for Constitution-
Making
Minimum obligations concerning public participa-
tion in public affairs are established by internation-
al human rights law and subsequent proclamations 
and elaboration by various human rights bodies. 
Such obligations are spelled out in Article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR 
1948)2 and Articles 1 (1) and 25 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR 1966).3 These rights are further elaborated 
in General Comment 25 by the UN Human Rights 
Committee.4 According to General Comment 25, 
conduct of public affairs has been expanded from 
voting in elections to encompass participation in 
constitution-making processes as well. However, 
the Comment goes on to point out that this right 
to participate in public affairs is a ‘subjective right’, 
meaning that citizens do not have the uncondi-
tional right to choose how they wish to participate. 
Rather, the state chooses the modality of participa-
tion, ensuring that people are provided with oppor-
tunities to participate in the process (Hart, 2010). 
Why Participate in the Constitution-Making 
Processes?
A well-thought out and planned participatory con-
stitution-making process does offer some signifi-
cant benefits. 
Nation-Building and Unity
More and more importance is being placed on con-
stitution-making in multi-ethnic societies because 
constitution-making is now seen as a means to 
build a nation as well as a state (Dann, Reigner, 
Vogel & Wortmann 2011, 3–4; Saunders 2014; 
Miller 2010, 644–47; Benomar 2004; Benomar C. 
August 2003; Hayson 2005; Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai & 
Regan 2011, 86–87). To achieve this goal of nation-
building, the constitution-making process must be 
inclusive and it needs to be a confidence-building 
process between people of different communities. 
Saunders also points out that there is now general 
agreement that a constitution must, in one way or 
another, originate from citizens, therefore citizens’ 
participation in the process of making a constitu-
tion has become very important (Saunders 2014). 
Enhancing Legitimacy of the Constitution 
With greater emphasis placed on citizen participa-
tion and the inclusiveness of the process of con-
stitution-making, it is argued that this will lead to 
greater legitimacy of the Constitution and citizens, 
through participation in the process, and will ulti-
mately lead to national ownership of it, therefore 
guaranteeing that the Constitution will be respected 
and followed (Saunders 2014; Benomar C. August 
2003; Benomar J. 2004; Moehler & Marchant, 5–6; 
Elkins, Ginsburg, & Blount 2008, 367–75; Blount 
2011, 39; Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai & Regan 2011). 
Well-Informed and Active Citizenry
Constitution-making offers people a chance to be 
educated on issues relating to democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law through civic educa-
tion and awareness programs. There are long-term 
benefits of this as through these programs citizens 
become democratically empowered (Benomar J. 
2004; Dann, Reigner, Vogel, & Wortmann 2011; 
Samuels 2006; Saunders 2014; Brandt, Cottrell, 
Ghai & Regan 2011). 
Dangers of Participation
While public participation in constitution-making 
is emerging as a general international norm and 
best practice, there are some clear dangers of allow-
ing too much participation.
Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai, & Regan (2011:87–90) 
caution that for divided societies, participation may 
be counter-productive. Groups and people may 
use the constitution-making process to seek self-
interested positions and not be prepared to work 
with other groups to seriously discuss a future that 
would reduce conflicts. Another potential problem 
with participation in divided societies is that debate 
and discussions tend to be narrow, usually revolv-
ing around sectional/ethnic interests as opposed to 
the interests of the nation as a whole. The partici-
patory process may be used by leaders of funda-
mentalist and intolerant groups to manipulate peo-
ple and cause further divisions. Therefore, instead 
of the process being one about nation-building, it 
could turn out to be divisive (Blount 2011, 39). 
There is another danger related to public par-
ticipation. Due to the diversity of interests involved 
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in the process, it becomes harder to find a practi-
cal settlement in divided societies (Blount 2011, 39; 
Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai, & Regan 2011, 87–90). Time 
and effort are spent on trying to reach a consen-
sus, sometimes making the process a lengthy one. 
Added to this is the reality of politics and decision-
making in divided societies. Decisions in divided 
societies are usually made by a small group of influ-
ential elites in a manner that might be non-partici-
patory and non-transparent.  
On occasions, decision-makers, as a form of 
appeasement, include provisions in (draft) constitu-
tions that they think will be most likely accepted by 
people (such as religious and ethnic groups) (Cot-
trell, Ghai, & Regan 2011, 87–90). 
With broad participation there is also a danger 
that the contitutional text that emerges out of this 
process may be ‘an adhoc creations, rife with inter-
nal inconsistencies and institutional mismatches’ 
(Blount, 2011, 39). 
Evaluating the Impact of Participation in 
Constitution-Making 
Evaluating the impact of public participation in con-
stitution-making processes is not easy. Just as con-
sensus is lacking on what participation means and 
how to achieve it, there is no agreement amongst 
academics and policy-makers on how to measure 
the impact of public participation in constitution-
making. At times focus is placed on the end result, 
i.e. whether a constitution has been achieved 
regardless of its quality, while at other times it is on 
avoiding a bad constitution. Some have even gone 
beyond these two criteria and measured the impact 
of participation by analysing whether the process 
was transformative in creating spaces for construc-
tive public discourse by an informed and active citi-
zenry (Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai, & Regan 2011, 85). 
Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai, & Regan (2011) sug-
gest eight criteria for assessing the impact of public 
participation in constitution-making. These are the 
effect of public participation:
• on the content of the constitution
• on resolution or creation of conflicts
• in broadening the political reform agenda
• on the responsiveness of the constitution to 
national goals and issues
• on the legitimacy of the constitution
• on citizens’ understanding of the system of  
governance
• on creating an informed and active citizenry
• on creating and promoting an understanding and 
support for constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Part II: History of Constitution-Making In Fiji
Constitution-making processes in Fiji since inde-
pendence have moved away from being closed-
session and elite-driven to processes which have 
involved high levels of public engagement. The 
debates surrounding issues of constitution-making 
have also been primarily focused on ethnic dis-
tribution of power between the two groups rather 
than issues related to nation-building. 
Before independence in 1970, the constitution-
making process was mostly carried out in private by 
leaders of major political parties together with colo-
nial officials and the deliberations of these meetings 
were confidential (Cottrell & Ghai 2010, 278–79). 
The participation of the public during constitution-
al discussions was negligible. 
After the coup in April 1987, the Governor-
General under pressure from the coup makers and 
the Taukei movement appointed Sir John Falvey 
to chair a Constitutional Review Committee that 
would ‘review the Constitution of Fiji with the view 
to proposing to the Governor-General amendments 
which will guarantee indigenous Fijian political 
interests with full regards to the interests of other 
people in Fiji’ (Cottrell & Ghai 2010, 280). This 
was perhaps the first time that the public were to 
be engaged in the constitution-making process. 
The Falvey Committee conducted public hearings 
in the four major urban centres in Fiji, as a result 
receiving nearly 950 written and oral submissions. 
People’s participation in the process was limited by 
geography and the prevailing political climate (Cot-
trell & Ghai 2010, 280).
However, the CRC was unable to produce a 
unanimous report which led to further politi-
cal uncertainty. In response to the uncertainties, 
Rabuka carried out another coup on 25 September 
1987, declaring Fiji a republic, installing himself as 
the head of an interim government, and later invit-
ing the former Prime Minister Ratu Mara to lead 
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an interim government. A Cabinet sub-committee 
was formed to prepare a draft constitution that 
largely took into account the proposals made by the 
Great Council of Chiefs. In 1989, the government 
appointed a retired colonel, Paul Manueli, to lead 
a Constitutional Inquiry and Advisory Committee 
to ascertain public response to the draft committee. 
The committee conducted 32 public hearings in 14 
centres, receiving more than 500 written and oral 
submissions. The Manueli Report culminated in 
the 1990 Constitution (Lal 1992, 284–95).
The 1990 Constitution provided for a review 
within seven to ten years of its promulgation (Lal 
1992). In 1993, an expanded Cabinet sub-commit-
tee that included representatives of the Opposition 
parties was set up to look into reviewing the 1990 
Constitution. After much deliberation, a three-
member committee headed by Sir Paul Reeves was 
appointed to review the constitution in 1995.
After much debate and discussion, wide-rang-
ing and highly ambitious ‘terms of reference’ were 
drawn up for the constitutional review process. The 
commission was tasked with the responsibility ‘to 
recommend constitutional arrangements to meet 
the future needs of the people of Fiji, and promote 
racial harmony, national unity and economic and 
social advancement of all communities.’ In attempt-
ing to fulfill this, the recommendations ‘had to 
guarantee full protection and promotion of rights 
and interests of the indigenous Fijian and Rotu-
man people, have full regard for the rights, inter-
ests and concerns of all ethnic groups and take into 
account internationally recognized principles and 
standards of individual and group rights.’ In order 
to achieve this, the commission had to ‘scrutinize, 
facilitate widest possible debate on the terms of the 
Constitution, and after ascertaining the views of the 
people, suggest how the 1990 Constitution could be 
improved to meet the needs of Fiji as a multiethnic 
and multicultural society. (Lal 1992, 284–95). 
From July to November 1995, the Reeves Com-
mission travelled throughout Fiji, receiving almost 
800 written and oral submissions. In 1996, the 
Commission presented its report titled The Fiji 
Islands: Towards a United Future to the parliament 
for deliberations (Government of Fiji 1996). It was 
only at the public hearings that citizens participated 
in the process. Once the Commission’s report was 
submitted to the parliament, citizens’ participation 
ceased. Once submitted to the parliament, the Joint 
Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC) took over 
and deliberations took place behind closed doors 
without any public involvement. The JPSC finalised 
the Commission’s report with some modifications 
into a Bill that was then subjected to the parliament 
for endorsement (Cottrell & Ghai 2010).
All three changes came about after military 
coups d’état. It is almost as if the occurrence of 
these coups signified a rejection of the constitution 
which was in place at the time. In some ways, Fiji’s 
coups have not only been coups against govern-
ments but also coups against constitutions and con-
stitutional arrangements. This project focuses on 
the processes of 2012 constitution-making in Fiji. 
Three fundamental characteristics that should be 
apparent to any avid observer of Fiji’s constitutional 
history are: the lack of citizen participation in the 
process, the exclusivity of the process itself, and, as 
a consequence, a lack of ownership of the resulting 
constitution by the people of Fiji. 
Constitution-making processes in Fiji prior to 
2012 subscribed to international trends in constitu-
tion-making in divided societies by restricting pub-
lic participation and leaving most of the negotia-
tions relating to constitutions to the political elites 
and representatives of different ethnic communities. 
During the various constitution-making pro-
cesses in Fiji public participation has generally 
been restricted. The agenda and the parameters of 
deliberations are set in advance. It can be argued 
that constitution-making has been an elitist pro-
ject, mainly driven by politicians. Public participa-
tion has also been restricted due to the lack of civic 
education on issues relating to the contents of the 
constitution and broader principles of democracy 
as a system of government. People have therefore 
been vulnerable to manipulation by the political 
elites before, during, and after constitutional delib-
erations. Debates on critical issues around nation-
building, such as national identity and representa-
tion, have been missing from the public sphere; 
these have mostly been decided by political elites 
acting on behalf of their constituents. Together the 
lack of public participation and inclusiveness has led 
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to a lack in ownership of constitutions in Fiji and 
contributed to the subsequent political upheavals.  
Part III: A Road Map to Democracy? The 
2012 Fiji Constitution-Making Process
Outline of the 2012 Process
On 9 April 2009, the Fiji Court of Appeal ruled the 
2006 military coup unconstitutional. The response 
by the military government was both swift and pre-
dictable. On the very next day, President Ratu Jose-
fa Iloilovatu announced that the 1997 constitution 
had been abrogated. One of the reasons cited by the 
president was that this would ‘facilitate the hold-
ing of true and democratic elections.’ (President of 
Fiji - Address to the Nation 2009). Apparently, the 
military regime deemed that the 1997 Constitu-
tion was not conducive to the facilitation of true 
democracy. The military government announced 
a roadmap for achieving ‘true democracy’ for Fiji. 
One of the important aspects of this road map was 
to be the adoption of a new constitution which 
should reflecting the aspirations already articu-
lated in the Peoples Charter for Change, Peace and 
Progress, a government-led initiative (National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji 2007). Since the 
abrogation of the Constitution (and the absence of 
the parliament), the military government ruled by 
decree (with presidential assent). The formulation 
of the decrees had no input and consultation from 
the public. The 2009 Administration of Justice Act 
removed the jurisdiction of the court to hear or 
determine a challenge to any government action. 
What actually happened was that the Cabinet con-
siders and approved decrees in secret which were 
then ratified by the President. 
With elections already scheduled to take place 
in 2014, it was imperative that a new constitution 
should be in place well beforehand. In 2012, the 
regime issued two decrees to facilitate the work 
on the new constitution: the Fiji Constitutional 
(Constitution Commission) Process Decree 2012 
or Decree 57 and the Fiji Constitutional Process 
(Constituent Assembly and Adoption of Consti-
tution) Decree or Decree 58. The former, Decree 
57, established and stipulated the mandate of the 
Constitution Commission whereas the latter pro-
vided for the establishment and mandate for a 
Constituent Assembly. The role of the commission 
was to inform the public at large about the pro-
cess, to collect and receive submissions from them 
and finally to draft a constitution in line with the 
views of the people and the non-negotiable princi-
ples that would then be presented to the Constitu-
ent Assembly for further deliberations. The role of 
the Constituent Assembly was to debate the draft 
Constitution, as well as the Explanatory Report of 
the Commission, and the views of the people of Fiji 
expressed on the draft Constitution; keep the peo-
ple of Fiji fully informed of the progress of debate 
and adoption of the draft constitution in its passage 
through the Constituent Assembly; and ultimate-
ly to adopt the draft constitution. 
Together the two decrees provided for a consti-
tution-making process divided into four stages with 
specified timelines. The first phase was the civic 
education phase (the primary responsibility of the 
government) which was to run from May to August 
of 2012. This phase entailed organising training for 
the people, to enable them to actively and effective-
ly participate in the constitution-making process. 
The second phase began in July finishing in 
October. This phase was the consultation phase 
where the Commission actually went out to hear 
and collect the views of the people. Upon the com-
pletion of this phase, the Commission was then 
required to prepare the initial draft of the constitu-
tion to be handed to the President by the first week 
of January. The last phase involved the tabling of 
the draft constitution to a Constituent Assembly 
which would deliberate further before the constitu-
tion finally came into effect. The whole process was 
scheduled to be completed by March of 2013.
The very first principle and objective that Decree 
57 laid out for the Constitution Commission was to 
‘ensure that the people of Fiji are able to participate 
in the process without any distinction based on race, 
gender, religion, age, occupation, status, residence, 
learning or disability’ (Government of Fiji 2012). 
The Constitution Commission was given a very wide 
mandate which required it not only to collect peo-
ple’s views but also to prepare the people and facili-
tate their participation (Government of Fiji 2012). 
Decree 57 stipulated 11 non-negotiable principles 
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which the Commission had to take into account in 
the draft constitution—namely, a common and equal 
citizenry; a secular state; the removal of systemic cor-
ruption; an independent judiciary; elimination of dis-
crimination; good and transparent governance; social 
justice; one person, one vote, one value; elimination of 
ethnic voting; proportional representation; and a vot-
ing age of 18. Overshadowing these 11 principles was 
the requirement for the constitution to grant immu-
nity for events of 2006 and thereafter. 
The regime, through its Roadmap to Democ-
racy, viewed constitution-making as legitimising 
its Charter process. It went to the extent of limiting 
public debate on issues that the regime felt strong-
ly about, that is, the 11 non-negotiables with the 
unconditional granting of immunity. At the cen-
tre of the Fiji Constitutional Process Decrees (57 
and 58) was public participation, and the regime 
kept reminding people that this was their process 
and that they should take part in it to determine a 
democratic and stable future. If changes were to be 
made to the draft constitution, Decree 58 (estab-
lishing the Constituent Assembly) made sure that a 
supermajority of two-thirds was required. Perhaps 
a reason for this was that the regime felt that, with 
the non-negotiables, public participation would not 
jeopardise their vision for what the constitution 
should look like. This also indicated a high degree 
of legitimacy for the participatory process. 
This paper will argue that the regime miscal-
culated the effects of the constitutional review, 
thereby abandoning the Commission’s draft and the 
entire process in 2013.  
Part IV: The Research 
Research Objectives
The general aim of this project was to examine 
stage 2 (Public Consultation and Submission Phase) 
of the constitution-making process focusing mainly 
on the question of participation. This was one of 
the central guiding principles of the Commission 
and is now judged as an important requirement of 
constitution-making. Specifically, the project criti-
cally analysed how the principle of participation 
was translated into practice: 
1. how people participated
2. the extent of participation
3. the impact of participation:
a. on the content of the draft
b. the  legitimacy of the draft.
The Constitution Commission was established 
and started work in July 2012 with a substantial 
programme of public hearings and other opportu-
nities for Fijians to submit their views to it. It was 
chaired by Professor Yash Ghai and included four 
other members: Professor Christina Murray, Pro-
fessor Satendra Nandan, Penelope Moore and Taufa 
Vakatale. Supporting the commissioners was a 
professional Secretariat and consultants. The com-
mission’s work was funded by the Fiji Government; 
however most of the funding came from traditional 
aid donors such as the British High Commission, 
and the Australian and New Zealand governments 
amongst others.   
Data Collection Methodology 
Data collection methodology for this project was an 
evolving one. As the project went on, the methods 
were modified from just directly observing 
participants to further one-on-one probing of 
participants on their motivations and the process 
they undertook before participating, to chatting 
with the commissioners and CSO representatives, 
to eventually randomly interviewing people who 
did not participate in the process. 
This research primarily relied on using qualita-
tive methods for data collection, namely, the direct 
observation of public hearings of the Constitutional 
Commission and informal, unstructured participant 
(participating citizens) conversations and discus-
sions of the process. The team, which consisted of 
two researchers, visited 20 (out of 110) public hear-
ings held by the Constitution Commission. The aim 
was to gain a first-hand impression of the process 
and ascertain citizens’ views of the process with rela-
tion to participation, inclusiveness, and ownership. 
The project also attempted to ascertain what the 
impact of public participation on legitimacy was. 
The 20 public hearings visited included a mix 
of urban, peri-urban, and rural areas on Viti Levu 
and Vanua Levu. Due to financial constraints the 
team was not able to visit any public hearings in the 
outer islands. 
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At the public hearings, the researchers observed 
and recorded the process, how the public deliv-
ered their submissions, the questions posed by the 
commissioners, the time allocated for individuals 
to make submissions, the environment, and so on. 
Individuals after they made submissions were then 
approached for a further interview, using a semi-
structured questionnaire to gain further insight into 
their motivations to participate in the process. 108 
people who made submissions (individually and on 
behalf of groups) at the 20 public hearing sessions 
were interviewed. Questions that were asked related 
to but were not restricted to: knowledge of the pro-
cess; knowledge and understanding of the constitu-
tion; and they put the submissions together.   
Most public hearings in communities lasted a 
few hours—usually two to four hours in rural areas 
and four to eight hours in populated urban and 
peri-urban centres. 
Informal discussions and conversations with 
the Constitution Commission Commissioners were 
also held to ascertain their views on the work of the 
Commission and the participation of people and 
the submissions. Conversations with ‘special inter-
est groups’ such as non-governmental organisations, 
faith-based organisations, women’s and youth groups 
and other community-based organisations were also 
held. About 20 CSO and special interest group rep-
resentatives were interviewed for this project. These 
groups’ views and opinions are important to the pro-
cess as some of them have a large following in the 
communities and many NGOs and CSOs conducted 
civic education sessions and were crucial in mobilis-
ing people to take part in constitution-making. 
An extensive literature review was also under-
taken in regards to comparative and historical situ-
ating of the constitution-making process. 
Data Analysis
Observations at public hearings — what was com-
mon, what was different in submissions — were 
noted down in a notebook. Individuals were identi-
fied for interviews, using a semi-structured ques-
tionnaire. Interviews were recorded then later tran-
scribed.
In analysing the data collected, the researchers 
looked for patterns across observations and 
interview responses. Then once patterns were 
formed, an inductive approach was used to draw 
out generalisations regarding people’s participation 
in the constitution-making process. The content of 
people’s submissions, the Commission’s Explanatory 
Report and its data analysis pivot table were also 
used to analyse data.   
Research Findings
General Overview of the Submissions Received by 
the Constitution Commission
The Constitution Commission wound up their 
public hearings after almost three months of 
travelling around the country. By the end of it 
all, the Commission had conducted 110 public 
hearings, receiving 1831 oral and/or written 
submissions at these sessions. In addition to 
this, they also received 5339 written submissions 
through post, hand delivery, and emails. Of 
these, more than 1000 were submitted as group 
submissions (Commission Constitution 2012, 123). 
The groups that participated varied in size from 
large, such as the Methodist Church, to medium, 
such as political parties, to small such as youth/
women’s groups. These groups also varied in how 
they drafted their submissions. For example the 
Methodist Church instructed the heads of 54 
divisions to draft submissions to submit to the head 
office for compilation as one Church submission 
while community-based youth/women’s groups 
organizing small meetings where they came up 
with issues they wanted to be reflected in their 
submissions. 
Timing and Sequencing of the Constitution-
making Process
Taking into account the broad mandate of the Com-
mission as stipulated in the Decree, the timeframe 
for the process gave organisations and the public 
very little time for preparation. The five-member 
Constitution Commission, chaired by Professor 
Yash Ghai, commenced its work on 31 July 2012 
with a three-month public consultations phase from 
3 August to 15 October (Commission Constitu-
tion 2012, 121–24). The regime announced a four-
phase constitution-making process on 9 March 2012 
beginning in May 2012 with nation-wide civic edu-
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cation (Fiji Broadcasting Commission 2012). Many 
civil society organisations interviewed stated that 
the timing and sequencing of the process was not 
ideal as it did not give them much time to mobilise 
funds and activities that would ensure that ordinary 
citizens are well prepared to participate (Costello-
Olsson 2013; Buadromo 2013; Yabaki 2013; Deo 
2012; Prasad 2012; Volatabu 2013). They felt that 
the process was rushed and better planning and 
information would have made it easier for them and 
their target groups to contribute meaningfully. 
An added problem with the timeframe and 
logistics of the public consultation phase was that 
the five commissioners had to break up into groups 
to ensure they covered more ground, thereby 
receiving submissions from more people. While 
ideally this does not seem to be problematic, this 
approach was contentious in some areas, mostly 
rural ones. Some people we talked to wished to pre-
sent their submissions to the Commission Chair, 
whom they felt was impartial and had more clout. 
In other areas, people hinted that they would have 
liked to see the five commissioners together listen-
ing to their submissions. This would have shown to 
the people the cohesiveness of the Commission and 
that the commissioners were listening to first-hand 
submissions. 
Civic Education and Awareness
According to Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai & Regan 
(2011:91), civic education is widely recognised as an 
important part of constitution-making processes, 
especially in highly participatory processes. Civic 
education usually entails enhancing knowledge about 
the role of a constitution and the choices that are 
to be made when making a new constitution, apart 
from knowledge of the constitution-making process. 
Constitution-making involves a variety of 
choices regarding complex issues. Making these 
choices requires provision of information about 
issues that are to be deliberated before any infor-
mation is to be collected. A participatory process 
requires citizens to make contributions to making 
choices which can be difficult to understand for the 
majority of the population. Without comprehensive 
civic education and awareness programs many peo-
ple will have little opportunity to meaningfully par-
ticipate in the constitution-making process (Brandt, 
Cottrell, Ghai & Regan 2011, 90–91). 
The commission was not charged with the 
responsibility to carry out civic education (Moore 
2013; Commission Constitution 2012). The regime, 
when announcing the constitution-making process 
in March, stated that it would carry out a nation-
wide civic education campaign from May to July 
because ‘the public must be well informed of the 
issues that they need to think about, that they need 
to address, and that they need to express’ (FBC 
2012). The Prime Minister went further, arguing ‘if 
the public is not educated about the issues to con-
sider, then the process will be useless’ (FBC 2012). 
The regime did not live up to its commitment to 
carry out a comprehensive civic education program 
before the start of the second phase of the constitu-
tion-making process. 
Even CSOs and the Constitution Commission 
failed in ensuring that people were well prepared 
before the public consultation phase got under-
way. The failure by CSOs to carry out compre-
hensive civic education was hampered in part by 
the restrictive decrees put in place by the regime 
(Buadromo 2013; Costello-Olsson 2013; Yabaki 
2013; Deo 2012; Volatabu 2013; Prasad 2012). For 
CSOs to hold public meetings they were required 
as per Section 8 of the Public Order (Amendment) 
Decree to apply for permits prior to holding meet-
ings (Government of Fiji 2012). The restrictions 
were lifted only after insistence by the Constitution 
Commission Chair once the Commission started 
its work in July (Commission Constitution 2012). 
Despite these obstacles, CSOs did manage to 
mobilise some funding and conduct limited civic 
education activities, mainly uncoordinated, around 
selected parts of the country (Buadromo 2013; Cos-
tello-Olsson 2013; Prasad 2012; Deo 2012; Volatabu 
2013; Kumar 2013). However, some CSO leaders 
did express disappointment over the fact that they 
could have planned and co-ordinated their civic 
education activities better (Buadromo 2013; Volata-
bu 2013). Organisations like the Citizens’ Consti-
tutional Forum (CCF), Fiji Women’s Rights Move-
ment (FWRM), Aspire Network, National Council 
of Women Fiji, Pacific Centre for Peace build-
ing (PCP), Youth Assembly of Fiji Islands (YAFI) 
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amongst others held community-based training to 
ensure people made submissions (Buadromo 2013; 
Costello-Olsson 2013; Kumar 2013; Volatabu 2013; 
Yabaki 2013). In one case, huge numbers of Indo-
Fijian women turned out to make submissions in 
Labasa (town in Vanua Levu) as a result of FWRM 
training and community sessions (Khan 2013). 
As a result of this limited awareness and train-
ing, the oral submissions made at the public consul-
tation venues lacked substance. Conversations with 
people after they had made submissions revealed 
that many did not understand the role constitutions 
play in a society, and many had not read the previ-
ous constitutions. Added to this, many people did 
not know much about the 2012 process, and some 
said that they heard about the Commission’s visit 
to their community, in passing, through the media 
or from other people. Most of the oral submissions 
dealt with public policy issues such as access to 
water, roads, health, education, wages, work con-
ditions, land and so on rather than institutions of 
state. While these issues are very important, it was 
observed that most submissions did not identify 
issues that a constitution normally deals with. The 
table below quantifies how many of the submissions 
mentioned one of the 17 thematic areas that the 
Constitution Commission used for data analysis.5
Prevailing Political Climate
As Mosmi Bhim rightly observes, the 2012 constitu-
tion-making process was undertaken ‘in the context 
of restrictive laws’ that may or may not have had 
an impact on how people participated, prior to and 
during the constitution-making process (Bhim 2013, 
168). After the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution 
in 2009, Fiji was operating under a state of emer-
gency (Public Emergency Regulations (PER) Decree 
(2009)) that severely restricted basic democratic 
Thematic Area Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Constitution-making processes 6675 417 7092
Citizenship and Ethnicity 5969 1123 7092
Language 6655 435 7090
Human Rights 1242 5840 7082
Electoral System 5932 1160 7092
Leadership & Integrity in Public 
Life
5714 1378 7092
System of Government 5845 1247 7092
Accountable Government 6082 1010 7092
Local Governance 5360 1732 7092
Great Council of Chiefs 5837 1255 7092
Land 4594 2498 7092
iTaukei Affairs 5696 1396 7092
Military 6347 745 7092
Coup Culture 6121 971 7092
Immunity/Amnesty 6467 625 7092
Transitional Arrangements 7010 82 7092
Religion 5304 1788 7092
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freedoms of assembly and expression. The regime 
put out decrees in regard to the functioning of inde-
pendent offices such as the judiciary, the Human 
Rights Commission, trade unions, media and the 
legal profession. In 2012, prior to the announce-
ment of the constitution-making process, the regime 
lifted the PER Decree and replaced it with Public 
Order Decree 2012 where all restrictions under 
PER 2009 were retained, along with increased pow-
ers to arrest and detain people (Bhim 2013, 169). 
However, a notable omission from the Public Order 
Decree was media censorship. This was covered 
under the Media Industry Development Decree of 
2010 and it limited the functioning of the media in 
a number of ways (Bhim 2013, 169–70). Yash Ghai, 
the Chair of the Constitution Commission, prior 
to taking up his post, called on the regime to make 
changes to laws severely restricting basic freedoms 
that would inhibit people from taking part in the 
process without fear (Rounds 2012). Later, the three 
major political parties — the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua, the Fiji Labor Party and the National 
Federation Party — aired similar concerns in their 
submissions to the Commission (Fiji Labour Party 
2012; National Federation Party 2012). This call 
from Ghai was dismissed by Bainimarama, who said 
that ‘the comments by the chair are unfortunately 
misplaced… He has been told time and again and 
the people of Fiji have heard about this. None of the 
laws currently in place stop any Fijian or hinder any 
Fijian from making any submission to the commis-
sion on any topic’ (Narayan 2012). 
The commission and regime’s relationship 
started on a high note with many promises of inde-
pendence, inclusiveness and openness. However, 
by late August the relationship started to deterio-
rate. Bainimarama was quoted in the media tell-
ing Ghai to ‘…concentrate on his job and not get 
involved in politics’ after Ghai had suggested that 
the regime refrain from scrutinising and criticising 
submissions made by people to the Commission 
(Bhim 2013, 172). Tensions came to a head in early 
November, when Bainimarama attacked the Com-
mission for being impartial in hiring the former 
vice-president as a consultant, even though it was 
well within the powers of the Commission to do so. 
The regime alleged that because of Ratu Joni Mad-
raiwiwi’s involvement, as the Roko Tui Bau, in pre-
senting a submission to the Commission that called 
for Fiji to be declared a Christian state, he had con-
tradicted one of the non-negotiable principles. In 
defending the Commission and its independence 
and impartiality, Ghai revealed that there was ‘mas-
sive interference’ by the regime in the work of the 
Commission, through emails telling Ghai what he 
ought and ought not to do (Radio Australia 2012). 
Subsequently, the regime promulgated an amend-
ment to the Constitution Commission Decree (No 
57), which stripped the  Commission of its role 
in reviewing and recommending almost 300-plus 
decrees to ensure consistency with the draft con-
stitution. The amendment decree also required 
the Commission to publish a monthly a financial 
report and a list of employees in the print media 
(Bhim 2013, 173–74). This was an overt indicator 
of the deteriorating relations between the regime 
and the Commission. 
In the interviews with CSOs, after the Commis-
sion wound up its work, most commented that the 
political climate had negative impacts on the con-
stitution-making process. Firstly, it did not provide 
a conducive environment for CSOs to carry out 
civic education activities prior to the public consul-
tation phase and then during the work of the Com-
mission through the assessments and criticisms 
made by the regime on people’s submissions (Deo 
2012; Kumar 2013; Prasad 2012; Volatabu 2013; 
Buadromo 2013; Yabaki 2013). Some CSOs went 
further by arguing that there was still a climate of 
fear, amongst some people, of not being able to par-
ticipate in the process without retribution (Prasad 
2012; Deo 2012). One human rights activist went 
even further by pointing out that in some places 
where the Constitution Commission was holding 
public hearings in the Western Division, there were 
police intelligence officers present, which was a fur-
ther sign of intimidation (Deo 2012).  
Traditional Decision-Making vs. Individual 
Mandate
One of the factors that ran contrary to the principle 
of participation in Fiji’s constitution-making pro-
cess is the existence of indigenous traditional struc-
tures. The indigenous Fijian way of life is largely 
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based on communal living. In this setting, impor-
tant decisions are usually made communally and 
there are protocols that define how decisions are 
arrived at and how they are implemented. Gener-
ally, important decisions are usually undertaken by 
men who hold traditional status in their communi-
ty. Once a particular decision is made by these tra-
ditional leaders, it becomes binding for the whole 
of the community.
The requirement for people to participate in 
the constitution-making process created a dilemma 
for some indigenous communities. For instance, 
in one of the provinces, the paramount chief of the 
province convened a meeting for all the subject 
chiefs within the province for the purpose of devel-
oping a provincial submission. ‘The paramount 
chief of the province was the first person to make a 
submission. As was expected, all other submissions 
that came afterward from the people more or less 
were aligned to submission presented by the para-
mount chief.’6
Another instance which showed this dilem-
ma was at the village of Votua in the Province of 
Nadroga. In this case one of the villagers made an 
individual submission which ran contrary to the 
village submission. Other villagers present were 
observed to have muttered to each other about the 
impudence of this fellow villager who had decided 
to break ranks with a decision the village leaders 
had already agreed upon.7
These two observed examples clearly show how 
indigenous traditional structures in some instances 
can actually create a dilemma for individuals who 
might want to participate as individuals. 
Constitution-Making and Nation-building
In modern times, constitutions in multi-ethnic 
societies serve not only as the supreme legal 
document but also as the focal point of citizens’ 
allegiances. In this regard, constitutions have 
also become for most countries a document that 
defines and binds a country and its people. For 
countries that have experienced political instability, 
constitutions can be used to address contentious 
issues that may have undermined the existence 
and the unity of the state. The Constitution 
Commission in its publication, ‘Building the 
People’s Constitution: Your Responsibility. A Guide 
to Constitution Making for the People of Fiji’ 
highlights that a constitution plays two important 
roles in a multi-cultural society beset by divisions 
and conflicts like Fiji: nation-building and state-
building (Constitution Commission 2012).  
The 2012 constitution-making process in Fiji 
can be regarded as an example of how constitutions 
may be used as an instrument of nation-building. 
The passing of Decree 57 by the military regime in 
March of 2012 provided the first impression as to 
how the new constitution and its formulation was 
going to factor into the larger notion of nation-
building. Under this decree the Commission was 
mandated to consult as widely as possible through-
out Fiji to try and capture how the people felt and 
what the people thought should be included in the 
constitution. The idea of allowing people to par-
ticipate actively in the constitution-making process 
was definitely a step in the right direction. Ideally, 
the opening of such a space should have allowed 
people to exchange their hopes, fears and aspira-
tions and more importantly helped them come to 
an understanding over the deep divisions that exist-
ed between the different groupings. 
Unfortunately, other factors were at work which 
greatly undermined the utility of the constitution-
making process as an instrument of nation-build-
ing. First and foremost was the restriction on free-
dom of expression which had been in place since 
the issuing of the Public Emergency Regulation in 
2009. This imposition closed off all public avenues 
through which people could vent out their frustra-
tions and disaffections. The negative impact of this 
censorship became apparent when the Constitution 
Commission began its consultation work. Some 
individuals and groups actually used this opportu-
nity to vent their disaffection against the regime. 
The manner in which some of these expressions of 
disaffection were presented indicated that the deep 
divisions between the two major ethnic groups 
were still very much alive. For instance, the call for 
the reinstatement of the 1997 Constitution by some 
of the I-Taukei was mainly because that particular 
constitution at least still protected some of their 
group interests.8 Others even questioned the legiti-
macy and the independence of the Constitution 
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Commission itself. In some ways the space which 
could have facilitated genuine mutual exchange 
became an arena of contestation and protest.
Another major factor was the regime’s insist-
ence on making a number of principles non-nego-
tiable. One such provision, which is of particular 
importance to nation-building, was that of a com-
mon identity. Ideally, having a common identity is 
a fundamental building block for any nation and 
should rightly be enshrined in a country’s constitu-
tion. Since independence in 1970, there had been 
no common identity to define all the citizens of Fiji. 
The regime thought it fit to address this important 
oversight and decided to adopt the term Fijian as 
the identity for citizens of Fiji. However, the term 
Fijian is one that had been used exclusively to refer 
to the indigenous population, and the decision pro-
voked opposition from the indigenous population 
who felt that they had been deprived of something 
which rightly belonged to them. This change also 
triggered protest from other ethnic groups, who felt 
that it was simply not right to use this term without 
first consulting the indigenous people. This issue of 
common identity, although declared non-negotia-
ble, also became contentious during the consulta-
tion process.  
The third and last factor was the timeframe and 
the approach used by the Constitution Commission 
in its consultation phase. If a constitution is to 
be used as an instrument of nation-building then 
its provisions needs to be conducive to such an 
objective. This can only be achieved if enough time 
and space is given to all stakeholders to have proper 
dialogue and come to some sort of consensus on 
what should be included in their constitution. The 
problem in Fiji’s case was that there was simply not 
enough time given for the people to try and sort 
out some of the issues that had caused division 
in the past. The four to six months’ timeframe 
was too brief to expect people to be ready to 
make substantive contributions to the making 
of the constitution. The other related matter was 
the approach undertaken by the Constitution 
Commission in its consultative process. In its 
endeavor to reach as many people as possible and 
to allow easy access to people, the Commission 
unintentionally missed the opportunity of bringing 
the different ethnic groups together. By visiting 
indigenous villages and Indo-Fijian settlements, the 
Commission was able to collect what they needed. 
However, they failed in the sense they could have 
brought different ethnic groups together and heard 
from all sides at the same time. This approach 
would also have allowed these different ethnic 
groups to also share their views with members of 
other ethnic groups and thus set the groundwork 
for inter-ethnic discussions. 
This is not a new or unique phenomenon for 
divided societies like Fiji that undergo constitution-
making. As highlighted by Cottrell, Ghai, & Regan 
(2011:87–90), the danger of further divisions and 
conflict caused by public participation is real. The 
rhetoric of nationalists and many grassroots indig-
enous Fijians as observed at the public hearings 
attest to the fact that the ethnic divisions (mistrust) 
that already existed in Fiji were on show and there 
was a sense of these divisions being exacerbated.  A 
unique opportunity to bring people with differing 
opinions together was lost. 
Participation in Practice: What Does This 
Mean?
Participation is much more than just opening 
spaces for dialogue. More importantly, it involves 
analysing the motive of the participation process 
and incul-cating skills that empower and enable 
citizens to participate effectively and meaningfully. 
‘Here the contrast and the relationship between 
spaces that are created through invitations to 
participate and those that people create for 
themselves become especially important’ (Cornwall 
2008, 274–75). Cornwall further states that invited 
spaces and the opportunities that are available 
for participation are frequently controlled and 
owned by those who have opened up the spaces 
(power wielders), and it does not matter how 
participatory they seek and claim to be (Cornwall 
2008, 275). For Fiji, the questions to be asked here 
are: What were the motivations behind allowing 
people to participate in the constitution-making 
process? And more importantly, how effective and 
meaningful was people’s participation? 
It can be concluded that the constitution-
making process was merely tokenistic. Decree 
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(No. 57) was clear regarding the functions of 
the Constitution Commission. Sections 7 and 8 
mandated the Commission to ‘inform’, ‘collect’, 
and ‘receive’ people’s views. While doing this, the 
Commission was to ensure that this process was 
coordinated with civic education so as to ensure 
that people had a good understanding of the issues 
before they expressed their views (Fiji Government 
2012). People had no control over what the 
Commission did with the information, how the 
Commission used the information collected, 
and whether or not their submissions were 
taken onboard or not. This is not to say that the 
Commission did not intend to use the information 
gathered during the consultation phase. The 
commission was genuine in its commitment and 
was actively forthcoming in asking people to make 
submissions to them and get their voices heard.
For the people, participation signified inclusion. 
Since 5 December 2006, people have felt emascu-
lated, unable to air their views, with constant threats 
to safety and security. Decisions had been made 
with no consultation or input by the communities. 
Finally after almost five and a half years of sup-
pression, they felt they could finally have their say. 
Initially, there was some skepticism from certain 
sections of the society regarding the whole process. 
It was seen as a regime-initiated and regime-driven 
project intended to legitimise the regime’s agenda. 
There were also concerns regarding the composi-
tion of the Commission, especially the inclusion 
of the three local commissioners who were known 
regime loyalists. However, as time passed, people 
and organisations started to see the process as inde-
pendent. This could be attributed to the impartial 
leadership of the Commission Chairman. People 
started feeling confident about the process, thereby 
lending it legitimacy. During this time the regime 
tried to interfere with the work of the commission 
through public pronouncements. 
For the Constitution Commission, participation 
meant a number of things. Firstly, it meant legitima-
tion for the process they were implementing and the 
draft constitution. It also meant sustainability and 
empowerment that would ensure that the people at 
large, through participation, understand and take 
ownership of their destinies. This the Commission 
tried to do with the draft constitution that they ulti-
mately produced where they tried to balance the 
demands of the regime with what the citizens had 
shared with them. Apart from granting the wishes 
of the regime (non-negotiables and immunity) 
albeit with conditions, the Commission tried to 
ensure that people’s participation in the new consti-
tutional order was guaranteed and that they had a 
significant and active role to play in the future gov-
ernance of the country.
For the regime, participation meant legitimation 
(Nominal Participation). As Cornwall (2008) 
and White (1996) noted, participation is about 
motivations that lead to [governments] adopting 
participatory approaches and about power and 
control.  It was evident from the beginning that 
the regime had predetermined the outcome of 
this process and that public participation for them 
meant giving credibility to their ambitions. There 
was a gap in the rhetoric of ‘genuine participatory 
process’ and the actions of the regime and the 
military prior to, during, and after the public 
consultation phase. From the very beginning, the 
regime set the tone (setting the timeline, selecting 
the Commissioners and so on) for the process 
without much consultation. The actions from the 
regime towards the later stages of the Constitution 
Commission’s work and the deterioration of the 
relationship suggest that the regime was unhappy 
with how things were unfolding, and felt it could 
no longer influence the process. The changes to the 
Decree (No. 57) that stripped away the power of the 
Commission to review all the decrees that had been 
in place  and also the powers of the Commission 
to present its draft to the people was rather 
unfortunate. A day before the draft constitution 
was to be presented to the President, police officers 
had seized copies of the draft being printed, with 
the Land Force Commander Mosese Tikoitoga 
defending the actions of the police by saying that it 
was not the Commission’s duty to print it (Australia 
Network News 2013). The Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Information Sharon Smith-Jones 
was quoted as saying that police burned printers’ 
proofs ‘for security reasons’, in an action taken ‘to 
preserve the integrity of the constitutional process’ 
(Callick 2013)
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After the Commission presented its draft to the 
President, the regime’s public relations machinery 
together with the military went on the offensive, 
personally attacking the Chair (Tikoitoga had said 
that the commission ‘was trying to destroy the 
process…his actions were unbecoming and they 
should be ashamed of themselves’) and some of the 
provisions of the draft constitution as undemocratic 
and unacceptable. 
On 10 January 2013 the President informed the 
nation that while the Commission’s draft contained 
a few good elements, ‘many of the provisions of 
the Ghai Draft positions us in the past. It has 
unfortunately perhaps succumbed to the whims 
of the few who have an interest in perpetuating 
divisions within our society’ (Fiji Times 2013). He 
instructed the regime to draw up a new draft after 
extracting ‘the positive elements of the Ghai Draft 
that will create true democracy, accountability and 
transparency and infuse into it, the key elements of 
the Peoples Charter and internationally accepted 
practices and standards and formulate a new Draft 
Constitution for me to present to the Constituent 
Assembly’ (Fiji Times 2013). 
It is fair to speculate that the regime was 
unhappy with the contents of the Commission’s 
draft and sought to de-legitimise the commission 
and its draft by personal and unwarranted attacks. 
Ultimately and ironically the regime used a very 
secretive and un-participatory process to draft 
its own version of what it thought should go in a 
constitution and present it to the people. 
The Attorney General started conducting pub-
lic sessions on the regime’s draft constitution which 
were at best a one-way affair — i.e., information-
giving with little time for debate and discussions. 
The regime’s alternative process received over a 
1000 submissions (through written submissions, 
emails, and text messages!). The contents of these 
submissions are yet to be made public. 
Concluding Remarks
The Constitution Commission and the pub-
lic consultation they undertook were praised by 
many. The more than 7000 submissions received 
was by no means a small feat. Never in Fiji’s his-
tory has such an extensive logistical exercise been 
undertaken. People participated extensively in the 
process and actors such as the Commission and 
NGOs enhanced and facilitated this. However, what 
remains to be answered (and it is beyond the scope 
of this paper) is whether this extent of participation 
was actually meaningful.
If our definition of participation is simply to be 
present and make a submission then we can safely 
conclude that this process has been successful to a 
large extent. Nevertheless, if we take into account 
the definition of participation in the typologies 
that have been discussed then we can conclude that 
the success of participation during this process is a 
mixed one. 
As noted earlier in this paper, academics and 
practitioners make claims that public participa-
tion ensures ownership of the document and builds 
legitimacy. However, when the regime started criti-
cizing the Commission’s draft, ultimately foregoing 
it for one drafted by them in secrecy, people mainly 
remained silent, instead of defending the document 
born out of a process that they participated in.
The regime’s refusal to accept the draft or 
to proceed with the promised process of further 
consultation suggests that the regime had 
predetermined the outcome despite proclamations 
of participation, inclusiveness, transparency, and of 
building a better and sustainable democracy. 
Postscript 
On 22 August 2013, the regime unveiled the Con-
stitution that was promulgated to by the President 
on 6 September 2013 (The Australian 2013).  Inter-
estingly, the 22 August version was made out to be 
the final version, yet the version of the Constitution 
that was promulgated to by the President on 6 Sep-
tember 2013 contained revisions that had not been 
declared publically. These actions by the regime 
clearly violated one of the main principles of the 
constitution-making process they had outlined in 
March 2012, i.e. ‘full, inclusive and fair participa-
tion of all Fijians’.  
After promulgating to the constitution the Pres-
ident, in an address to the nation, stated that ‘With 
this document, we lay to rest the institutionalized 
divisions and inefficiencies’ that have plagued us 
and embrace a common future in which we all have 
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an equal stake. And we lay the foundations of a new 
Fiji — taking our place among the great democra-
cies and fulfilling the dream we all share of bet-
ter days to come’ (The Fijian Government 2013). 
Bainimarama described the new constitution as a 
‘blueprint for democracy’, marking a ‘new begin-
ning’ for the island nation. He proclaimed that the 
2013 constitution will make Fiji democratic — ‘The 
2013 Fijian constitution enshrines principles that 
are at the heart of all the great liberal democracies...
an independent judiciary, a secular state and a wide 
range of civil, political and social-economic rights’ 
(Australia Network News 2013). 
While this was going on at the Presidential 
House, a group of youth and women’s rights activists 
had gathered outside to protest the promulgation of 
the 2013 Constitution.  The group argued that ‘the 
President’s assent is just providing a rubber stamp 
to the controversial document, which replaces the 
constitution set aside by the military backed regime 
in 2009’ (Radio Australia 2013). Shortly afterwards 
14 protesters, mainly women, were taken in by the 
police for questioning, and detained for several 
hours.  The Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM) 
in a statement supporting the protestors claimed that 
‘the group was protesting against today’s signing into 
force of the Fiji constitution, which has been contro-
versially pushed through by the government despite 
a lack of transparency and lack of public participa-
tion’ (Pacific Media Centre 2013).
After eight years of arbitrary rule, Fiji held elec-
tions on 17 September 2014. Political campaigning 
in the lead-up to elections had many hotly debated 
topics, ranging from issues related to public policy 
to changes to the 2013 Constitution. On 14 June 
2014, in her speech, the leader of the Social Demo-
cratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), Ro Teimumu 
Kepa, stated that once elected to power her party 
will seek to change the 2013 Constitution. In doing 
this, it will refer to the Supreme Court ‘for an advi-
sory opinion on the status of the 1997 Constitution’ 
(RNZI 2014). Following this announcement, the 
Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
(RFMF), in an interview with The Age, stated that 
‘the military will not tolerate an elected govern-
ment rewriting the Constitution’ (Marks 2014). This 
statement drew the attention of the political parties 
and activists who saw the military’s unwillingness 
to accept the results of the elections and the mili-
tary attempting to play the role of the defender of 
an imposed constitution that grants them full and 
unconditional immunity. The Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP) called on the military and its commander to 
‘respect the will of the people’, but the commander 
went further and called on them to ‘to show support 
for a constitution for Fiji which is genuinely demo-
cratic, will ensure transparency and good govern-
ance and provide political stability’ (Fiji Live 2014). 
These pronouncements by the military 
commander do not augur well for the future 
stability of Fiji. The intention to change the 2013 
Constitution by the major political parties (except 
the regime-backed Fiji First Party) indicates the 
lack of ownership and legitimacy in the document 
that was borne out of a fraught process, a document 
written in secrecy with the intention of preserving 
the status quo. 
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Endnotes
1 We would like to acknowledge and thank our 
mentors, Associate Professor Greg Fry and Dr Nicola 
Baker from the School of Government, Development 
and International Affairs at USP who provided 
support and advice during the project and who also 
provided comments on the draft. We would also 
like to thank Professors Stewart Firth, Brij Lal and 
Anthony Regan who peer-reviewed the paper before 
and during the 2014 Pacific Research Colloquium. 
This paper was presented at the 2014 Pacific Research 
Colloquium held from 28 January – 7 February at the 
Australian National University, Canberra.
2 For the full text of the UDHR, see <http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/law/udhr.htm>. 
3  For the full text of the ICCPR, see <http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm>. 
4  For the full text of  General Comment 25, see <http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/d0b7f023e8d6d989802
5651e004bc0eb>.
5 More analysis is currently being done on this by  
analysing 117 the sub-thematic areas that the 
Constitution. Commission had devised for analysing 
the submissions. 
6 Observation of the Constitution Submissions under-
taken at the village of Noco for the Province of Rewa.
7 Observation of the Constitution Submissions 
undertaken at the village of Votua in the Province of 
Nadroga/Navosa.
8 This includes the recognition of traditional 
institutions such as the Great Council of Chiefs, 
an electoral system that ensured communal 
representation, recognition for them as indigenous 
and recognition of some of their history such as 
Christianity and the Deed of Cession.  
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